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teen exclusions in subsection (b). Furthermore, neither a broad nor a
narrow interpretation of the language in question relieves a foreign
employer of the possibility of duplicate taxation on wages paid pur-
suant to its foreign employees' performing services within the United
States. The solution to the problems raised cannot adequately be
solved by judicial pronouncements. Congress created the ambiguity
in section 3121, and, absent a treaty provision covering the situation,
the burden of its clarification must rest with that body. The specific
exclusion from employment of services performed within the United
States by foreign citizen employees for foreign international highway
carriers is one possible method of clarifying the situation. This sug-
gestion does not appear unrealistic since the indicia of this type of
service do not differ significantly from services performed in connec-
tion with foreign vessels or aircraft which are specifically excluded
under FICA.56 A broader remedy for the situation could best be ac-
complished by clearly stating in section 3121(c) that its provisions
contemplate in "excluded service" only the specific exclusions listed
in section 3 121(b). Adoption of the latter suggestion could save the
courts from having to render further judicial interpretations to deter-
mine the scope of "Included and excluded service" with respect to
the definition of employment in section 3 121(b).
DAVID LEAcH BAIRD, JR.
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Following the view that a corporation is a trust,' the equity courts
of the early nineteenth century created the shareholder's derivative
action to enable the cestui que trust to sue his trustee.2 Thereafter,
6'Note 1 and accompanying text supra.
"See Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832); Taylor v. Miami Export-
ing Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831).
2Apparently the earliest American case in which the subject was considered
was Attorney Gen'l v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371 (N.Y. 1817), where the
court noted that persons who exercise the powers of a corporation may be liable
as trustees. In Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831), the court
discussed the duties of directors in terms of both trust and agency and held that
a shareholder may maintain a bill in equity for an accounting. The court in
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832), reiterated the view expressed in
Utica in allowing a derivative action against directors for "improper conduct
in the management of the trust." 3 Paige Ch. at 222. See 4 J. POMAEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDrNcr § io88 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941).
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such cases continued to be brought only in equity,3 with the resulting
absence of a jury.4 To maintain a derivative suit, the shareholder
must show to the satisfaction of the court that all possible remedies
within the corporation have been exhausted, and that he has made
an earnest effort to induce remedial action by the directors.5 The
derivative action is brought on behalf of the corporation and the
claim being sued on is the corporation's claim.6 The damages re-
covered go to the corporation, rather than to the individual share-
holder.7 When the claim asserted by the shareholder is legal in na-
ture, within the context of the seventh amendment, a problem arises
as to whether or not there is a right to a jury trial.
3Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Dodge v. Woolsey,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
The Court in Dodge stated the rule that courts of equity have jurisdiction to
prevent actions by corporate directors ". . if the acts intended to be done create
what is in the law denominated a breach of trust." 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 341. It
is to be noted that in this early case the Court talked in terms of "restraining"
acts for which there was no "adequate remedy at law." Id. In Koster, the Court
noted that the shareholder's derivative action"... is an invention of equity to
supply the want of an adequate remedy at law to redress breaches of fiduciary
duty by corporate managers." 330 U.S. at 522. See generally 2 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 730 (1959); N. LATIN, THE LAw OF CORPORA-
TIONS 349 (1959); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
§ 80-4 (1969).
'This is the general rule as stated in most of the treatises. E.g., 2 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 730 (1959). Contra, DePinto v. Provident
Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9 th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950
(1964). Cf. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting CO., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
rCohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (dictum); Hawes
v. Oakland, 1o4 U.S. 45o (1881); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. If these elements are not
shown, the shareholder must give an adequate explanation. The reason for this
rule, as stated in Hawes, is to prevent fraud and collusion on the part of the
directors in admitting the action to federal court. 104 U.S. at 460-61.
OSee Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 Us. 541 (1949); Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U-. 518 (1947); DePinto v. Provident Security
Life Ins. Co., 323 F.Rd 826 (9 th Cir. 1963); cert. denied, 376 U.S. 95
o (1964); Rich-
land v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Liken v. Schaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432 (N.D. Iowa 1946) ("When a stockholder institutes a derivative suit, it is
the same in legal effect as if the corporation itself had sued." Id. at 441); Miller
v. Weiant, 42 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1942); W. KNEPPER, LIABILrrY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DmECTORS § 8.04 (x969). Knepper states, "If the corporation does not
have a cause of action, there can be no recovery in a stockholder's derivative
suit." Id.
'Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (dissenting opinion); Dewing v.
Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193 (1877) (dictum). See generally W. CARY, CORPORATIONS
868-79 (4th ed. 1969).
"U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
19701
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The problem of the right to a jury trial in a derivative action was
presented to the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of
Ross v. Bernhard.9 The plaintiff in Ross charged the directors of his
corporation with "gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, willful mis-
feasance, bad faith, [and] gross negligence,"'1 and sought an account-
ing.11 The district court refused to strike the plaintiff's demand for a
jury trial12 and on an interlocutory appeal the circuit court reversed.13
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court.
The Court held that the seventh amendment right to trial by
jury is applicable to any "individual issue" in a derivative action
which is legal in nature. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that
a derivative suit has two phases, ". . . first the plaintiff's right to sue
on behalf of the corporation and second the merits of the corpora-
tion claim itself."' 4 Where the "corporation claim" is in part legal the
right to a jury trial attaches. The Court found that at least one of the
"individual issues" to be tried was legal in nature.15 If the corpora-
tion itself had brought the action it would have been entitled to a
jury trial. Therefore, since the shareholder in a derivative action is
asserting the rights of the corporation, he also should be entitled to a
jury.
While the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in actions at
common law has been held inapplicable to the states,' 6 it is of great
importance in proceedings in the federal courts.' 7 The question as to
990 S. Ct. 733 (197o).
'OId. at 734. The action was brought under the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8oa-i to -52 (1964).
119o S. Ct. at 734.
"2 Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The district court rea-
soned that the plaintiff's demand for an "acounting" was essentially a demand
for a money judgment, a legal demand, and thus held that a jury trial was
appropriate. d. at 570-71.
aRoss v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). In reaching its decision the
court merely reiterated the traditional view that since derivative actions were
created by equity, the seventh amendment guarantee has no application. Id. at 914.
190 S. Ct. at 736 (footnote omitted).
1 Md. at 740. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that historically
neither party in a derivative action could be granted a jury trial, such actions
being equitable in nature. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan joined in
this dissent. Id. at 74o-45.
1OPearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. go (1875);
Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874). The clause pertaining to
appellate review of facts found by a jury has been held to apply to the states.
The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869).
"7 Dairy Queen, Inc. V. Wood, 369 US. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U-. 500 (1959); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654 (1935); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. io6 (18g1). Cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S.
221 (1963); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 US. 474 (1935).
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which actions are encompassed by the guarantee presents itself. The
Supreme Court at an early time determined the test to be whether the
action was tried by a jury when the seventh amendment was adopted
in 1791.1 In using this "historical" test a court merely decides whether
in 1791 the action was at common law, in equity, or in the admiralty
court.19 The jury trial right attached only when the action was at
common law. The Court has reasoned that the framers of the seventh
amendment meant to preserve the distinction between law and
equity actions by inserting the "suits at common law" provision. 20
In other words, if the framers had intended that equitable actions
were to be tried by a jury, they would not have limited the jury trial
right to common law actions. Thus, the amendment was interpreted
so as not to infringe upon the jurisdiction of the equity courts.21
jury trial in an equitable action did not arise as frequently as it does
today. In 1891, the Supreme Court held that legal and equitable
relief could not be sought in the same action, since to do so would
jeopardize the jury trial right on the legal issues.23 By 1922 the Court's
position had changed; legal and equitable issues could be blended in
the same action, but the equitable issue had to be tried first. Any re-
maining legal issues could then be tried by a jury.
2 4
After adoption of the Federal Rules and the resulting merger of
law and equity into one form of action,2 5 the problem of a right to
jury trial in traditionally equitable actions became more severe. The
"character of the overall action" approach was formulated to deter-
21 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (183o) (dictum).
u"hough innocuous in appearance, the "historical" test has led to many
problems, particularly where new actions have been developed which did not
exist in 1791. Obvious examples may be found in the new actions developed in
the commercial law field, and actions created by statute. In such a situation, a
court may attempt to draw an analogy between the action in controversy and a
"similar" action in 1791. This would amount to speculation as to hoiv the courts
would have viewed the action in the eighteenth century, a highly unsatisfactory
mode of determining the applicability of a constitutional right.
tmParsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
2Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856).
Prior to the merger of law and equity in 1938,22 the question of a
ntFED. R. Civ. P. i provides that there shall be one form of action, designated
a civil action.
'Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 1o6, 112 (1891).
"Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922). In this case,
the Court merely reiterated the view that the practice in the English and American
courts in 1791 determines the construction of the seventh amendment. Id. at 243.
2FTE. R. Civ. P. i.
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mine whether or not the right to a jury trial existed.26 This test in-
volves deciding whether the basic character of the overall issue pre-
sented in the action is legal or equitable.2 7 The problem, according
to Professor Fleming James, is that there are no adequate guidelines
for determining what constitutes the character of the action.28 He
suggests that in determining the character, a court could ascertain the
suitability of trial by jury; or that the character could be defined by
custom-whether the action is usually tried by a jury. A third possibil-
ity suggested by James is to examine the action using the "historical"
test.
2 9
Since the same factual situation often gave rise to both legal and
equitable claims, the prior determination of the facts on the equitable
claim acted to estop litigation of the facts on the legal claim.30 The
Supreme Court's solution to this dilemma was announced in Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,31 where a claim determined by the district
court to be equitable was met by a legal counterclaim. To alleviate the
problem of estoppel, the Court held that where both legal and equit-
able claims are presented, legal issues must be tried by the jury.32 The
I'E.g., Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (gth Cir. 1946) (basic nature of action
legal, hence triable by a jury prior to adjudication of equitable issues); General
Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949) (basic
nature of issue determines right to jury trial). See generally 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 38.16 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]. Traditionally, the
"character of the overall action" test has been referred to as the "basic nature of
the issue" -test.
"j5 MooE 38.16.
21F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.11 (1965).
"The "character of the overall action" test, though strongly advocated by
Professor Moore and adopted by a number of courts, note 27 supra, was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
It is apparent that the test was a semantical device to enable a court to do no
more than examine the overall character of the action, rather than look at
whether legal issues existed. For a further discussion see text accompanying notes
31-33 infra.
"See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962); Thermo-Stitch, Inc.
v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1961). In Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Bonney, 299 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Okla. 1969), an equitable action
to foreclose a mortgage was met by a legal counterclaim with a demand for a
jury trial. The court held to try the equitable claim first would estop a trial of
the facts on the legal counterclaim. Holding this to be a blending of legal and
equitable claims, the court ordered the entire case tried by the jury.
m359 U.s. 500 (1959).
"'The Court elaborated on this point by saying that
... only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in
view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now antici-
pate, [footnote omitted] can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be
lost through prior determination of equitable claims.
Id. at 51o-11.
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Court rejected the "character of the overall action" approach and
adopted instead an approach which considers all the individual issues
to determine whether or not the right to jury trial is applicable. If a
legal issue is present, it will be tried by a jury and the problem of
estoppel will be eliminated. 33
Three years after Beacon, the Court further ensured this seventh
amendment right. In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,34 the Court was faced
with a demand for a jury trial in an action for an injunction and an
accounting. The Court reasoned that the constitutional right to a
jury trial cannot be made dependent upon the label given to the re-
lief sought.35 Instead, where the relief sought is essentially a money
judgment the action must be tried by a jury unless the plaintiff can
show that the relief demanded would be too complicated for a jury
to understand.30
The court considered the "nature of the relief" sought instead of
the cause of action alleged, and then applied the "historical" test.
Where the relief sought would have been obtainable at common law
in 1791-damages, for example-the right to a jury trial attaches.37 The
Court determined that the relief sought was essentially legal. It na-
turally followed that the parties were entitled to a jury.3S By con-
=See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Winnemore, 413' F.2d 858 (5 th Cir. 1969) ; AMF
Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150 (1oth Cir. 1965); Thermo-Stitch
Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5 th Cir. 1961); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Bonney, 299 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Okla. 1969). In Thermo-Stitch, the court
reasoned that it is immaterial that the basic issue of the action is equitable, or
that the equitable cause clearly outweighs the legal cause. Where a legal issue is
present, the right to jury trial attaches. 294 F.2d at 491.
1369 U.S. 469 (1962).
2Id. at 477. In the district court the defendant demanded a jury trial which
denied on the ground that the action was purely equitable; any possible legal
issues were merely incidential to the action. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc.,
194 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
2 369 U.S. at 478. The Court held that to avoid a trial by jury, the plaintiff
must show that the "'accounts between the parties' are of such a 'complicated
nature' that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel them." Id. quoting
Kirby v. Lake Shore 8: M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
3Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968) (no part of
relief sought could be construed as legal, hence no jury trial); Simmons v.
Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers Union, 350 F.2d 1o02 (4 th Cir. 1965) (relief
sought was legal in nature, hence case triable by a jury). Contra, Klein v. Shell
Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1967) (form of relief sought is not determinative,
but is a factor in deciding whether action is legal or equitable). Cf. McGraw v.
United Ass'n of Plumbing, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965) (recovery of money damages
only incidental to equitable relief sought).
-369 U.S. at 479. A similar result has been reached in the circuits. Kennedy
v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (3d Cir. 1969) (accounting sought for patent infringe-
ment held not too complicated for a jury); Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 1oo
1970]
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sidering whether or not a jury would be confused by the proceedings,
the Court indicated its willingness to take a more functional approach
to the jury problem. Subsequently this approach has been followed
in the lower federal courts.3 9
Shortly after Dairy Queen, the Ninth Circuit decided the case of
DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co.4 0 The court held that
while a shareholder's action is brought in equity, if the claims as-
serted present a legal issue the right to a jury trial attaches. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court observed that the derivative action as-
serts claims belonging to the corporation.4 ' Had the corporation it-
self brought the action it would have been entitled to a jury trial on
any legal issues presented. The court then reasoned that the right to a
jury trial on legal issues should attach regardless of which party-
plaintiff brings the action.
42
As noted earlier, the derivative action was created by the old
equity courts as a device to enable the beneficiaries (shareholders) of a
trust (the corporation) to sue their trustees (directors) for breach of
duty.4 3 The courts which have considered this problem since DePinto,
and thus after Beacon and Dairy Queen, have followed the more tra-
ditional approach.4 4 For example, in Local 92, International Associa-
tion of Iron Workers v. Norris,45 a derivative action seeking an ac-
counting was brought against the leaders of a labor union. The Fifth
Circuit denied the defendant's demand for a jury trial, reasoning that
the derivative action was traditionally equitable in nature.40 In
Richland v. Crandall,47 another court struck the plaintiff's demand for
a jury trial in a derivative action, reasoning that such an action could
(8th Cir. 1967) (legal claim presented in proceeding to enforce a trust held triable
by a jury); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 4o6 (5th Cir. 1964) (accounting for
profits held to be a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction and thus triable
by a jury). Cf. Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486
(5th Cir. 1961) (where a legal cause is present, the right to a jury trial attaches).
Contra, Senchal v. Carrol, 394 F.2d 797 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968).
30E.g., Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (3d Cir. 1969); Burgess v. General
Elec. Co., 285 F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J. 1968).
40323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
'1323 F.2d at 836.
1Id.
"-Text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
4"E.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 9o9 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 275 F. Supp. 569
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Local 92, Int'l Ass'n of Iron Wkrs. v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1967); Richland v. Crondall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dictum).
'5383 F.2d 735 (5 th Cir. 1967).
"The court noted -that "... the relief sought is, not only in name but in
substance, traditionally equitable." Id. at 740.
'259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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never be a suit at common law for seventh amendment purposes.48 The
circuit court in Ross v. Bernhard9 relied on the ". . teaching of his-
tory that the stockholder's derivative action has always been regarded
exclusively as a creature of equity to which the right to a jury trial
does not apply."50 That court distinguished Beacon by noting that in
Beacon a jury ,trial right had been lost, while in this case no right to
a jury trial had ever existed. The court further noted that law courts
have never recognized derivative suits, and thus any legal claim in-
volved therein had traditionally been decided by -the equity courts. 51
All of these cases holding contrary to DePinto were decided using the
"historical" test.
52
In Ross, the Supreme Court's reasoning was essentially the same as
that used by the Ninth Circuit in DePinto. The plaintiffs in Ross
sought an accounting but the Court had announced in Dairy Queen
that it will look behind the label of the action to see if the "nature of
the relief" is legal and if the action is suitable for jury trial.53 The
corporate legal claim was for negligence. By splitting the concept of
the derivative action into two phases the corporate claims were segre-
gated. Under Beacon, once a legal issue is found, the seventh amend-
ment jury trial right comes into being.54 The Court also announced
the proper method for determining whether the nature of each indi-
vidual issue to be tried is legal. 55 The Court first considers the pre-
1938 custom, thereby employing the "historical" test, and then the
remedy sought, thus using the "nature of the relief" test. Then the
Court will assess the practical abilities and limitations of juries, 6
under the doctrine announced in Dairy Queen. Consequently, the
Court has adopted a modified version of James' guidelines for the
"character of the overall action" approach which will now be used
to determine the nature of each individual issue to be tried.57
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion 5s in Ross relies heavily
on the "historical" test. In his application of the "historical" test,
48Id. at 279. On the basis that the action was also brought as a class suit
the case was remanded for a jury trial. Id. at 280.
"'4 03 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
wId. at gi.
MId. at 914.
r-'rext accompanying notes s8-2o supra.
r7Text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
r4Text accompanying note 31-33 supra.
",o S. Ct. at 738 nao.
r"Id.
Oid. at 738.
r'Id. at 74o-45.
